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While globalization has led to what can – with reference to Karl Polanyi – be referred to as a 
disembedding of the labour market from its nationally segmented settings, recent decades bring 
about a development identifiable as a ‘countermovement’. As the text shows, drawing on the 
example of European Works Councils and International Framework Agreements, this process of 
‘re-embedding’ takes place through a network of different measures of labour regulation. It is for 
this reason that establishing a relational perspective on cross-border phenomena in the field of 
labour relations can count as a central future aim in this strand of research. 
 
 
KEY WORDS  
cross border research, European works councils, globalization, international framework 






‘Workers of the world, Unite!’ – viewed from today´s perspective and the context of the 
challenges brought about by globalization, the rallying cry of proletarian internationalism 
proclaimed by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels in 1848 implies an optimistic notion of the 
possibilities for cross-border coordination of workers’ interests, leading to a classless and stateless 
world society. History has so far not proved this revolutionary prediction right. ‘Real socialism’ 
collapsed, and the logic of markets spread over the world. Many scholars of international labour 
studies therefore are sceptical about the question of whether collective regulation of work and 
employment across borders could work and have a future. Increased international competition 
and globalized value chains have caused shifts in patterns of labour regulation in most industries 
and countries. Mainly, an erosion of national labour regulation regimes is diagnosed as an effect 
of almost unregulated international competition, value chains and trade – transnational 
mechanisms or even a global governance of labour regulation by most scholars in the field is seen 
as wishful thinking. In this paper it is argued that during the last twenty years or so an 
institutionalising texture of transnational labour regulation emerged and strengthened. This has 
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to be understood as a way to restrain the logics of markets as well as of corporate and national 
interests and to institutionalise the logics of minimum standards, collective actors and civil 
society. 
Since the interrelation of economy and society over time has always been at the core of 
sociological interest (Spencer 2003; Weber 2001; Durkheim 1984), insights from historical 
approaches to the development of this relationship are available within a rich instrumental set of 
different sociological perspectives. Here, for the second half of the twentieth century 
contemporary diagnoses and perceptions point at the increasingly dynamic character of this 
interplay, which leads to new uncertainties for individual as well as collective and corporate actors 
(Cohen and Kennedy 2000; Beck 1999; Hann and Keith 2009). In their study on ‘labour in the 
age of insecurity’ Webster et al. (2008) propose a perspective on the impact of globalization on 
local realities of work and employment, deploying the concept of market embeddedness, which was 
originally introduced by Karl Polanyi in the 1940s. According to Polanyi the dynamics of 
modernization are constituted through an interplay of the market and other institutions of 
economic coordination, competing as complementary principles to organize the production and 
distribution of goods and services. A developmental model which can roughly be derived from 
Polanyian thought unfolded in the course of subsequent general academic discussions. In this 
vain, economic globalization is understood as a partial ‘disembedding’ of nationally segmented 
markets and of production systems structured by national institutions. Many authors hold that 
this economic globalization led to a ‘neoliberal’ global logic of competition, value chains, 
production and trade (e.g. Altvater and Mahnkopf 1997; Burawoy 2010; Webster 2010), which 
is almost unbound from any kind of institutionalised regulation and control.  
In line with an institutional approach and based on empirical evidence from meso-level 
studies on global value chains, production models and business models (e.g. Pries and Dehnen 
2009; Ruigrok and van Tulder 1995; Spatz and Nunnenkamp 2002; Sturgeon and Florida 1999; 
Whitley 1992), this paper emphasizes that tendencies of global disembedding of economy from 
societal regulations and norms are accompanied by tendencies of re-embedding and re-
institutionalising through the search for new regulative arrangements. While on the one hand the 
logic of liberal market coordination of action and resources has grown, an increasing 
entanglement of mechanisms, levels and collective actors of labour regulation is emerging as cross-
border texture of work and employment regulation (Pries 2010). Accordingly, emerging measures of 
cross-border labour regulation can be understood as tendencies to re-embed economic 
relationships, which have been tossed away from their former national settlements. Based on the 
Polanyan concept of dis-embedding and re-embedding and on the neo-institutional world polity 
approach of John Meyer it will be argued that during the last decades and in parallel with 
globalisation of capitalism there developed a multitude of old and new dynamics of cross-border 
labour regulation such as workers’ world commissions in international companies, Global Union 
Federations, Grassroots’ Campaigns, European Works Councils, International Framework 
Agreements, Multinational Guidelines, Core Labour Standards, or Global Compacts. Such 
mechanisms have been analysed and discussed mainly as singular logics of cross-border labour 
regulation, but not in their complex interplay. Consequently, almost all of these elements of 
cross-border labour regulation were stated as ineffective or weak or useless for recapturing and re-
embedding global capitalism. Such a view falls short in the same way as if the strength and 
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functions of the single parts of the ecological entanglement of a jungle were evaluated bit by bit in 
an isolated manner.  
For example, an International Framework Agreement (IFA) in place in one specific 
multinational company might work where there are strong collective promoters at the company 
level and where social movement activists use the OECD-Multinational Guidelines for 
submitting queries at the corresponding National Contacts Points. The complementary 
densification of labour regulation measures emerges as a cross-border network texture with 
reference and in relation to various actor groups as well as social, political and economic 
structures beyond the territorially bounded power-frame of a single nation-state. While such 
measures of international labour regulation seem relatively weak when looked at in isolation from 
each other, a consideration of their interplay promises to provide a much more fruitful insight on 
the matter: By drawing on the results of empirical research conducted on European Works 
Councils as well as on International Framework Agreements, the paper will empirically base the 
theoretical approach proposed above.  
After briefly sketching out the implications and challenges for international labour 
regulation brought about by globalization, the paper draws on the idea developed earlier (Pries 
2010), according to which single cross-border mechanisms of labour regulation have to be 
understood as part of an emerging texture of various entangled and often complementary 
measures which (often in an unintended way) strengthen a framework of norms and rules suitable 
to creating order in the challenging field of the international economy. Drawing on the example 
of the emerging institutions of European Works Councils and International Framework 
Agreements, this basic idea of an emerging cross-border texture of labour regulation will be 
developed in the following two sections. Finally, we will sum up our findings by reflecting on 
desiderata for further research. 
 
 
Labour Regulation in a Globalized Economy 
Economic globalization (e.g. Seidmann 2007) made processes that were once nationally 
segmented constellations of labour regulations subject to increasing international competition. 
According to many scholars, this led to an erosion of traditional constellations of labour 
regulation, which were usually framed by the institutional setting of the nation-state. As Egels-
Zanden (2009: 3) states, ‘industrial relations systems have historically been embedded in a 
context of national tripartistic arrangements, negotiated by actors engaged in ongoing 
relationships with each other’. According to Burawoy (2009: 90), the United States took a 
leading role in this process of economic ‘dis-embedding’: ‘It had its epicenter in the United 
States. Beginning in the mid-1970s, the turn to a market economy led to the decimation of 
national industries and its labour movements as US industrial capital fled to greener pastures’.1 
Besides the general axiom that economic internationalization actually has taken place,2 another 
widely shared assumption points at the structural weakening of the bargaining power of workers 
and their collective representatives in negotiations with management. Through the development 
of what could be called a global market for labour,3 the supply side (i.e. the workers) is pressured 
into lowering their exchange expectations: ‘It is a commonplace that, in the past 30 or so years, 
the transnationalisation of production from the global North to the global South has played a 
major role in shifting power away from workers to employers’ (Wells 2009: 567).  
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This had led scholars to take on a position which has become known as the so-called race-
to-the-bottom-thesis, which is applied not only in the field of social policy but also in connection 
with labour regulation within an internationalizing world economy: ‘As states decline, so do 
workers’ rights’ (Tilly 1995: 21). If we thus understand this problem against the backdrop of 
state-centred policy-approaches, which were typical for the 20th century, the absence of a 
superordinate Leviathan, the international landscape of collective regulation measures might 
appear to be a neoliberal desert, a characterisation which we know from the early 1980s ‘end 
time’ genre (Mad Max, etc.).4 According to Thomas (2010: 1) ‘globalization processes have 
produced a downward pressure on labour standards that neither nationally based labour laws nor 
international institutions such as the International Labour Organization have been able to 
effectively counter.’ As Koch-Baumgarten (2006: 208) states, the establishment of a sufficiently 
institutionalized industrial relations system in a corporatist sense on a global or at least 
supranational (e.g. European) level seems improbable not only to scholars who research the topic.  
While traditional corporatist patterns do not seem to be rigidly transferable to a supranational 
level, it would be far-fetched to assume that there are no concepts of labour regulation to cope 
with the effects of market liberalization. ‘Thus, unions and other civil society organizations have 
pushed for new approaches to the regulation of labour standards, creating pressures for the 
emergence of new forms of transnational labour rights regulation’ (ibid: 1). While management 
induced measures were often directed at weakening the bargaining power of workers through the 
introduction of competitive elements in the cross-border coordination of labour policy, strategies 
of workers’ representatives were manifold and sometimes contradictory. Meanwhile, some union 
and company-based workers’ representative bodies (like works councils) concentrated on 
defending employment and preventing outsourcing, while others proactively fought for a 
sustainable and socially acceptable restructuring process. Simultaneously, some collective actors 
focused on their local, regional or at most national territory, and still others invested a lot of 
energy in networking at a transnational level by accumulating social capital and building alliances 
with other political actors, such as social movements or government representatives: 
 
‘As a consequence of TNCs’ growing flexibility and capacity to shift production from one 
country to another, trade unions began to attempt to create a social framework for the 
global economy in order to bridge the growing gap between TNCs’ strategic options, 
which transcend national borders, and their own limited capacity to act, since they are 
largely circumscribed by national boundaries’. (Telljohan 2009: 5) 
 
It is exactly this emerging constellation into which measures of cross-border labour 
regulation are being brought about by a spectrum of actors which reaches beyond the classical 
triangle of (nationally segmented) states, capital and labour representatives. Looking at the 
broader landscape of cross-border labour regulation, various forms of such regulative measures 
can be identified (see Pries 2010: 157). Firstly, on a global level wide-ranging minimum 
standards, such as the ILO-core norms, constitute an ethical framework, suitable to formulate 
basic requirements for working and employment conditions around the globe. While chances to 
control a company’s compliance with the provision of such basic rights seem relatively weak, the 
general opportunity to relate to such frameworks can serve as a useful point of reference for 
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labour representatives in calling for decent working conditions and to define new milestones of 
legitimacy – something corporate actors and companies have to consider and take seriously.  
In this context, the notion of legitimacy goes far beyond formal-legal rights. It points at 
the general embeddedness of economic action within a broader societal framework. Here the neo-
institutional concepts of organisational fields and of world polity as well as the Polanyan idea of 
re-embedding come in. Neo-institutionalism argues that organisations adapt their structure and 
strategy to the institutionalized expectations of their ‘organisational field’ – even sometimes 
against the specific organisational imperatives of rationality and efficiency (Meyer and Rowan 
1977; Powell and DiMaggio 1991). Concerning international companies as profit organisations 
this means that – in order to legitimise themselves in their multi-dimensional organisational field 
of stakeholders and shareholders – they actually take into consideration the perceived legitimacy 
expectations of the organizational environment. Adaption to these legitimate expectations can be 
induced by mimetic (imitating, copying, representing), normative (following professional rules 
and standards) and coercive (laws, legal pressure etc.) mechanisms. Insofar as perceived legitimate 
expectations of how to act in an organizational field get habitualised, typified and symbolically 
sedimented, they are institutionalized within particular organizational fields.  
Taking this basic idea of neo-institutional thinking, the very different mechanisms of 
transnational labour regulation could get institutionalized and build parts of complex 
transnational organizational fields, in which states, companies, international organisations etc. as 
corporative actors and other groups of collective actors perceive social reality and define strategies 
of action according to the institutionalised patterns of legitimate social relations and behaviour. A 
crucial question then is, to what extent different mechanisms of collective and transnational 
labour regulation are perceived and work as institutionalised patterns that forge the behaviour of 
all actors in the organisational field. For the area of science and education Meyer (2003) argued 
that some social institutions like a public and compulsory system of primary and secondary 
education established world-wide. Therefore he speaks of a world polity as consisting of global 
social institutions that – although not necessarily fully implemented all over the world – represent 
a set of rules, values and mechanisms accepted globally as legitimate. In a similar line it could be 
argued that since some two decades or so an institutionalised framework of transnational labour 
regulation is emerging. 
As pointed out by Karl Polanyi, the challenges of marketization are met by societal 
reactions, which he identifies as ‘countermovements,’ enacted by social actors trying to cope with 
the implications of these processes. The interplay of the expanding market and the societal 
reactions can thus be understood as ‘the action of two organizing principles in society, each of 
them setting itself specific institutional aims, having the support of definite social forces and using 
its own distinctive methods’ (Polanyi 1957: 132). Taking up Polanyi's description of the societal 
development of market-disembedding and market re-embedding, it is possible to say that waves 
of commodification and de-commodification of labour can be encountered at different points in 
history (ibid; also Burawoy 2010: 307). Due to that, increased international mobility of capital 
measures of labour regulation that once operated in nationally bounded conditions are no longer 
strong enough to protect labour from threats of relocation or the top-down implementation of 
poor working standards in countries or regions where labour representatives have low bargaining 
power. By not only focussing on the impact of globalization on labour regulation, but also 
extending his approach to the fields of nature and money, Burawoy (2010: 307) comes to a 
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conclusion which appears less optimistic than the prospects of a re-embedding movement. 
Primarily focussing on the latter two (commodification of money and nature), he states that: 
  
‘[S]o far the third wave has delivered new and wild forms of the commodification of 
money, turning it from a medium of exchange into a tool of profit making, based in 
derivatives, futures, and securitization of loans, and operating through hedge funds largely 
outside the control of states’. (ibid: 307) 
 
Many scholars similarly have argued that not only money and nature but also labour is 
experiencing ‘wild forms of commodification’. As Burawoy notes with regard to the application 
of the Polanyian concept of ‘re-embedding’, it is the global starting point which a 
countermovemet in the abovementioned sense would need to take (ibid 2010: 311). With 
reference to the objections of Burawoy, Webster (2010: 386) criticizes the ‘use of dichotomies in 
framing the local versus the global’ (also see Lambert 2010 as well as the other contributions from 
the controversy in the same issue [3/2010] of Global Labour Journal). As he further argues, 
neither methodological nationalism and the classical focus on the triad of state, employer 
associations and unions, nor a global perspective are able to capture what is going on in the field 
of transnational labour regulation (Pries and Seeliger 2012). Instead, what can be detected as 
potentially re-embedding transnational labour regulation depends on the perspective taken. 
As demonstrated in Table 1, a broad range and scope of different measures and initiatives 
of regulating conditions and relations of work, employment and participation at a transnational 
level can be identified, which have been introduced by a broad variety of collective actors 
involved. Besides international organisations like the ILO and the global employee and employer 
associations, European Works Councils emerged to coordinate measures of employee 
representation beyond the shop-floor and national level. A further important point lies in the 
appearance of additional and new actors putting forward an agenda of workers’ rights. Social 
movement activities like the ‘Clean Clothes Campaign’ (Balsiger 2010) led to new rules of 
behaviour in corporate business organizations. Furthermore, supra-national collective and 
corporative actors more and more try to put forward common frameworks of regulation, such as 

















Table 1: Types of Transnational Labour Regulation 
 




The crucial argument to develop here is that looking at each of the different types or 
logics of labour regulation as isolated mechanisms will easily lead to underestimating the actual 
impact and potential regulatory power of the mechanism. For instance, ILO minimum standards 
as fixed in the eight core conventions signed by the majority of all states worldwide will have 
almost no effect on work and employment conditions if at the local or national level there are no 
strong collective actors (whether state agencies, social movements, consumer organisations, 
unions etc.) promoting them. European Works Councils, although equipped with a legal basis of 
information and consultation rights at the European level, will hardly have any regulatory effect if 
there are no national representatives, unions and managers at the local, national and European 
level engaged in the logic of regulation. In general, the density of the actual transnational network 
texture emerges from the interplay of various different types of cross-border labour regulation. 
Unions or union federations might provide logistical support for monitoring initiatives or the 
capacity building of experts involved in social movements (Zajak 2009). Country-support and 
loans granted by the International Monetary Fund or the technical assistance of the World Bank 
might be made conditional on the nation-state’s compliance with the global ILO core 
conventions. The actual dynamics of the OECD multinational guideline may depend on the 
engagement of social movements, NGOs, unions or states in controlling for the basic principles 
and reporting failures to the National Contact Points. In the following paragraph, the argument 
of the entanglement of these different transnational regulation mechanisms will be developed by 
drawing on the examples of European Works Councils and International Framework Agreements 
as parts of the broader transnational network texture. It is a politically important and scientifically 
33 
 
crucial question under which conditions these different mechanisms work in which ways and 
with which outcomes. To understand their dynamic character, which distinguishes them from 
the classical patterns of national tripartite negotiations in the next two sub-sections the argument 
of an emerging network-texture of transnational labour regulation will be developed, drawing on 
the two examples of typical measures used in cross-border labour regulation: European works 
councils and International Framework Agreements. 
 
 
EUROPEAN WORKS COUNCILS 
The general directive on the introduction of European Works Councils (EWCs) was 
passed by the European Council of Secretaries on the 22nd of September 1994 after circa ten years 
of ongoing discussions and prior attempts. It required the national governments which had 
backed the EWC-directive5 to create the legal basis for the introduction of EWCs within their 
states. The respective law in Germany (EWCL) was passed on the 28th of October 1996 by the 
parliament. All companies with locations in at least two EU member states, each with at least 150 
employees, and which had more than 1,000 employees distributed amongst EU member states, 
can institute a EWC6 on the basis of an agreement between a ‘special bargaining committee’ and 
European business management. In 2006 the ETUI-EWC database registered 773 EWCs in a 
total of 2,204 companies that would qualify for such a council.7 
EWC regulation typically distinguishes three periods of EWCs. The first phase runs from 
the mid-1980s to 1994, and was a time when voluntarily agreed-upon employee information- 
and consultation organs were created. In this period 49 EWCs were created in 46 companies 
(Kerckhofs 2003:15). The second phase reaches from the period of the passage of the EU 
directive in September 1994 to its transformation into national law in September 1996. During 
this phase a number of so-called ‘voluntary agreements’ were reached on the basis of Article 13 of 
the EWC directive. As these did not necessarily have to accord with the procedure laid down by 
the directive and it was possible to deviate from the envisaged design, many companies were 
interested in grabbing the opportunity to reach a voluntary agreement on the procedure of 
information and consultation before the directive took effect (Hoffmann 1997:120; Lecher et al 
2001: 194). During this ‘bargaining under the shadow of the law’ the number of agreements grew 
rapidly. Almost 400 so-called Article 13 agreements were finalised (see also Kerckhofs 2003). The 
third, so-called Article 6 phase refers to the period after the September 1996 implementation of 
the directive in national law, and with it the institution of EWCs according to ‘standard legal 
procedure’. 
In the expanding social science research on EWCs completed since the second half of the 
1990s very different theses on the possible meaning, effectiveness and developmental perspectives 
of EWCs have been put forward, with mainly sceptical views predominating. On the one hand, 
Streeck (1997) criticises the lack of regulatory power of EWCs, arguing that it lags far behind the 
regulatory power made possible by the German model of employee participation. On the other 
hand, he criticises the deficient link between the EWC institution and Europe. He considers 
EWCs to be mainly extensions of the lobbies of the respective headquarters’ home country, whose 
structural principles and modes of operation are conveyed to other parts of the company via the 
EWC. In this spirit EWCs are (dis)qualified as ‘neither European nor works councils’ (Streeck 
1997: 328). In view of the danger of ‘social dumping’, the EWC as an employees' committee is 
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not an appropriate instrument, neither in intra-company, nor in cross-country competition 
(Keller 2001). Location competition has further intensified since 1996 and ‘EWCs have failed to 
become a pan-European vehicle for trade union coordination’ (Hancké 2000: 55). 
According to some scientists close to labour unions there is a ‘danger of a European neo-
syndicalism’ (Schulten 1997: 97). EWCs are viewed critically especially because they present 
themselves as potential partners for collective contracts, and therefore directly compete with 
labour unions as national or even pan-European wage bargaining partners. This argument claims 
that the increase in company-related regulation of tariff matters on a European level might lead 
international companies to withdraw from national contract relations, thereby additionally 
accelerating the tendency toward erosion currently displayed by the national bargaining systems. 
Another point of criticism is the voluntarism regarding the concrete form of EWCs. The ‘political 
effectiveness’ of an EWC accordingly depends on the (single) company’s power relations and the 
backing of labour unions (Schulten 1999: 201). 
Optimistic views, in contrast, emphasize the evolutionary dynamic of EWCs which must 
still be considered as a ‘search and orientation process’ (Platzer and Rüb 1999). These accounts 
argue that the behaviour of some EWCs clearly surpass the degree of participation provided for 
by the directive, and that this should lead to positive effects for the European and national 
systems of labour relations (ibid). 
The very nature of EWCs is quite unique in the world and in the landscape of European 
organisations because they are effectively (1) European law-based non-profit organisations, (2) 
based on the different national transposition laws of the countries where the corresponding 
companies are active, (3) working on the basis of an agreement negotiated at the European level 
between management and labour representatives, and (4) directed towards Europe-wide active 
companies as profit organisations embedded exclusively in the corresponding national law 
systems. At first glance due to this complex national, supranational and company level 
organisational network, EWCs are a promising answer to the problem of interest regulation in 
times of increasing economic internationalisation. 
But EWCs are not only very interesting and particular in organisational and institutional 
terms – they are also very important in practice. Despite the fact that only about one third of all 
companies falling under the EWC directive actually have a EWC, their significance and impact 
upon labour regulation at the European level should not be underestimated. When the European 
Union consisted of fifteen member states EWCs represented a total of about 17 million people 
(Hertwig et al 2010). Taking into consideration the new EU member states, the number of 
people receiving direct representation is even higher. As EWC coverage increases both with the 
number of employees and the number of countries in the EEA the companies are active in, 
almost two third of all workers and employees engaged in companies that are active Europe wide 
are currently represented by a EWC.  
Therefore, it is not surprising that there is a broad stream of scientific research and debate 
about EWCs. The European automobile industry is of crucial interest, first, due to the high 
concentration of companies falling under the directive and, second, because of the significance of 
some explicit debates and conflicts which touched the European level of labour regulation (like 
the General Motors case or the Volkswagen-Porsche conflict). Scientific debate on EWCs 
concentrates on the character, function and reach of the EWC. Is this new Europe wide active 
body an unsuitable instrument to cope with economic internationalisation? Will it mainly 
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function as an information and communication channel for management? Or can it develop to be 
a powerful and effective means of organising and expressing worker interests at a supranational 
level? Are the EWCs just mere extensions of labour regulation patterns and dynamics of the 
country where a company’s headquarters are located? Or can they actually introduce a genuine 
European dimension to labour relations and a new logic of transnational labour negotiations?  
Empirical research seeking to answer these questions is focused mainly on two issues. 
First, it seeks to develop an adequate typology of EWCs (based on their internal structure and 
pluri-local plant relations as well as their relations to management and unions) and, second, it 
seeks to control for variables (like sector, age of the EWC, country of company’s headquarters) 
influencing these types of EWCs and their corresponding output and efficiency as a means of 
interest mediation and conflict regulation. There is some empirical evidence of the impact of (1) 
country of headquarters, (2) sector characteristics and (3) periods of negotiating and signing the 
EWC agreements on the figures and outcome of EWC’s working dynamics. Until now, little 
attention has been paid to the impact of company structures on the corresponding structures and 
activities of EWCs. However, previous studies have pointed out that there is a wide degree of 
variance amongst EWCs regarding their activities and their ability to effectively influence 
company decisions and represent employee interests. While some EWCs operate on a low level 
(as simple ‘tools’ for the distribution of selected management information), others play an 
important role in the overall communication and interest regulation of the company at the 
European level. To explain these variations in EWC cooperation structures and characteristics, 
the majority of literature is based on an (extended) industrial relations approach. This dominant 
research perspective on EWCs could be widened by an organization-based research approach. It 
could be proven that one has to pay special attention to the specific figure of distribution and 
coordination of resources, power, culture, and knowledge at the European company level 
(Hertwig, Pries and Rampeltshammer 2010). In this perspective, the organizational fit between 
the cross-border company structure and the structure of the corresponding EWC at least partly 
explains its output. In this way EWCs could be considered as tools for re-embedding cross-border 
active companies within a supranational framework of labour regulation. When, apart from this, 
EWCs are also crucial cross-border actors for developing European or International Framework 
Agreements – as was shown for example by Dehnen and Pries (2012) – the entanglement of 
different mechanisms and logics of cross-border labour regulation becomes obvious. 
When trying to understand the phenomenon of EWCs within a broader context, a strong 
entanglement within the multidimensional network texture introduced above becomes apparent. 
First, European legislation provides a framework in which EWCs (if demanded by the employees) 
become a mandatory element of company structures. Second, cooperation between local or 
national unions and/or international union federations is crucial for bonding and capacity 
development in EWCs. Third, as shown by empirical research in the automotive sector, an 
assessment of an EWC and a comparison of different EWCs is hardly possible when considering 
only the number of formal agreements signed, the resolutions passed or the strike activities 
initiated; the situational and institutional context of company structures and cultures must also be 
addressed (Hertwig, Pries and Rampeltshammer 2011: 223).  
A further interconnection, which will be highlighted in the next paragraph, refers to 
EWC’s involvement with global company-wide measures of labour regulation, such as 
international framework agreements. 
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INTERNATIONAL FRAMEWORK AGREEMENTS  
Since the first application of International Framework Agreements in the late 1980s a 
broad body of literature has emerged that treats IFAs as an innovative form of cross-border labour 
regulation.8 According to a general definition proposed by Fichter, Helfen and Sydow (2011), 
IFAs can be understood as ‘a tool for enforcing the recognition and implementation of minimum 
labour standards and as a contract between unions and transnational corporations’. Through their 
implementation, the actors involved (usually management and internal company worker 
representatives as well as international unions) pursue four different and often complementary 
goals (see ibid): (1) ensuring compliance with the ILO´s core labour standards, (2) recognition of 
the Global Union Federation as a negotiation partner, (3) global institutionalization of viable 
collective conflict resolution mechanisms, and (4) the organization of transnational solidarity. 
In December of 2010, over 80 IFAs existed, involving a total of 6.3 million of the 77 
million workers employed in multinational companies on a global scale (Papadakis 2011).9 While 
this is only a small portion of the entire workforce employed in MNCs, the last twenty years have 
seen significant numerical development for IFAs. While only 23 IFAs existed in the period 
between 1988 and 2002, by 2007 there were 56 (ibid), most of which were signed in the metal 
sector. As can be derived from the general description of IFAs as a social phenomenon and their 
role in shaping the reality of cross-border labour regulation given above, the instrument – as in 
the case of the European works councils – is mainly focused on the company level. However, as 
the involvement of various groups (unions, shop-floor organs, management actors) illustrate, their 
particular dynamics cannot be simply reduced to one-sided intentions and ambitions. Instead, 
functional international agreements require cooperation between all actors introduced. As Rüb et 
al (2011: 21) point out, a low degree of organizational and informational networking between 
unions and shop floor representatives raises the probability of taking actual influence on policy 
measures within the framework of a particular MNC. Although the central measures addressed 
through IFAs relate to intra-company issues, attempts to transcend the ‘shop-floor-focus’ of the 
instrument can also be found. In a document analysis carried out in late 2008, Welt (2011: 54) 
finds that 46 percent of existing IFAs inform suppliers and encourage them to adhere to the 
content of the IFA. Moreover, 14 percent take measures to assure supplier compliance and 
another 9 percent even assume responsibility for the entire supply chain. Another significant 
element that constitutes the particularly relational character of IFAs as instruments of cross-
border labour regulation is the designated reference, which is given to comprehensive standards as 
the ILO-norms or CSR-approaches such as the United Nations Global Compact: ‘What 
distinguishes IFAs as a policy tool beyond their labour relations character is their 
acknowledgement of CSR approaches, such as the United Nations Global Compact or the 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development Guidelines’ (Fichter and Helfen 
2011: 86). This very same conclusion can also be drawn from a finding provided by Thomas 
(2010: 11): ‘Some companies with framework agreements […] may engage in third party 
monitoring processes through their broader CSR programs, though framework agreements do not 
establish these kinds of processes themselves’. 
The value-based reference points of IFAs by no means plainly emerge from intra-company 
negotiations or dispositions, but instead function in close relation with a global moral framework 
constituted by multipartite actors, such as the International Labour Organization, or even within 
broader discursive arenas.  
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It is not surprising that the constellation within which an International Framework 
Agreement gains its shape and meaning presupposes the existence and involvement of relatively 
strong organs of worker representation. These can both be located at the company and broader 
union level. For Hennebert and Bourque (2011: 158) global union federations:  
 
‘are at the junction of complex social and political interactions in which they are only one 
actor. Their role must thus be conceived in relation to other local, national and regional 
levels where union organizations have historically been rooted and, at times, endowed 
with substantial resources’. 
 
In their seminal work on global unions, Platzer and Müller (2009) point out how crucial 
these federations are for the cross-border coordination of worker representatives. However, recent 
empirical developments have also shown the central role that shop-floor representation can take 
on in the development of such framework agreements. Here, for example the Volkswagen Works 
Council takes a leading role. A step toward a new level of worker participation in cross-border 
contexts could be taken by Volkswagen management and the International Metalworkers 
Federation jointly signing an IFA on the international implementation of co-determination 
measures in all countries, represented within the World Works Council. (Wannöffel 2010; 
Baum-Ceisig and Osterloh 2011). 
Interest is IFAs is no longer confined to worker representatives at the level of the local 
shop-floor, national, or even international level. Nor is it only of interest to civil society actors 
engaging in NGO initiatives, such as the Clean Clothes Campaign. A general interest in 
International Framework Agreements can also be seen to come from the side of management:  
 
‘In line with the GUF’s main objective of establishing an ongoing dialogue with 
transnational companies through the conclusion of an IFA, the GUFs usually try to settle 
any violation of the provisions of an IFA in cooperation with management. (Welt 2011: 
58) 
 
Due to the Marxist inheritance of industrial sociology, capital-labour relations are often 
described as genuinely conflictual, and yet the coordination of IFA-measures relies on 
cooperation between the two groups of actors which might lead to a blurring of the traditionally 
perceived demarcation line. Interestingly, this conceptual argument can also be supported by a 
study conducted by the ILO which states that management can take an interest in engaging in 
International Framework Agreements. This general assumption is based on the finding that an 
increased trust in labour relations at the company level can be found amongst shareholders and 
other investors (ILO 2010).  
While the ILO study introduced above measures the impact on shareholder trust in 
companies, management actors could moreover generally be assumed to be interested in 
maintaining a proper image for customers and stakeholders. This is where one of four points of 
critique with regards to such framework agreements can be formulated. While firstly the 
regulation of core labour standards can be said to be generally desirable, it is important to note 
that a simple window-dressing approach pursued by management will not help to bring about 
sustainable measures in the mid-to-long term. While an IFA might make sense as an idea or 
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sound suitable as a rhetorical figure, its implementation must be actually carried out for it to take 
effect. Secondly, the integration of global union federations is crucial for the coordination of IFAs 
in a cross-border context. What must also be clear is that this may require major engagements 
which may overstretch scarce resources. A third potentially weak point is the generally voluntary 
nature of IFAs. As Thomas (2010: 15) notes, a stronger foundation within supranational 
legislation might seem desirable in this context, as ‘transnational labour rights regulatory 
strategies must move beyond binary approaches to regulation based on state-based versus 
voluntaristic, privatized methods’. 
A fourth open question finally points at the inclusive character of International 
Framework Agreements. While IFAs generally help to create acceptance for measures suitable to 
de-commodification of the character of wage-labour on a global level, one must acknowledge the 
fact that they do not yet address the major share of workers who are integrated in global 
production chains. One might thus perceive the danger of IFAs leading to the privileging of 
strongly unionized workers in international original equipment manufacturers or first-tier-
suppliers, leaving out all those who are unable to organize sufficiently. A strong trade unionism 
alone cannot be the only answer for the sustainable regulation of international labour. 
 
‘In sum, IFAs are the most participative category and also the one closest to a traditional 
understanding of industrial relations – in the sense of negotiation, consultation or simply 
exchange of information between employers and workers on issues of common interest 
relating to socio-economic policy – and to the notions of collective bargaining, dispute 
prevention and resolution, as well as respect for labour law’. (Papadakis 2011: 3) 
 
It thus can be concluded that International Framework Agreements open certain 
opportunities and challenges for cross-border labour regulation. What seems important to note is 
that they gain their particular significance not in isolation from other measures taken in this 
sense, but are to be understood in a close interrelationship with the broad portfolio of cross-
border regulation initiatives. A first obvious interconnection can be found in the fact that 
company-level regulation in the form of an IFA is often a measure complementary to or 
promoted by a company-level body of labour regulation, such as a European or even World 
Works Council. Moreover, as is e.g. noted by Fichter et al (2011a: 602), IFAs are strategically 
sought after and used by Global Union Federations aiming to secure their own acceptance and 
using organizing potential that exists on the local level to achieve recognition of the ILO’s core 
labour standards. In this explicit reference to the comprehensive framework provided by the ILO 
lies a third important example for the structuring power of the cross-border network texture. 
Having presented the two examples of European Works Councils and International 
Framework Agreements within their particular contexts of (international) labour regulation, now 









Re-Embedding the Global Market? 
Although economic globalisation represents a kind of dis-embedding of markets and value 
chains from the exclusive control of nation states and from the national settings of institutional 
arrangements such as labour regulation, counteracting mechanisms of re-embedding also exists 
which also contribute to emerging textures of transnational labour regulation. Global minimum 
standards for work and employment conditions as defined by the ILO, the integration of national 
and regional union confederations in a Global Union Federation, the mechanism of imposing the 
OECD multinational guidelines on companies active in cross-border contexts, the foundation of 
World Works Councils in some important sites controlled by global players, transnational 
labelling and branding strategies such as ‘Fair Trade’ or ‘Decent Work’ as well as EWCs and 
International Framework Agreements are ties that form part of an emerging transnational texture 
of labour regulation that increasingly enmeshes and re-embeds the globalised economy.  
There could be a myriad of examples and arguments cited that make claims against the 
efficiency of each of these mechanisms and against interpreting a transnational texture of labour 
regulation. When looking at any one of the mechanisms that has been mentioned in an isolated 
manner there always could be doubt: ILO minimum standards do not work when there is no 
collective actor or sensitive public opinion, for example, and this is just the case where they would 
be needed. OECD multinational guidelines are almost unknown and do not work in many 
companies. EWCs are often weak in comparison to local or national representation bodies, like 
shop stewards or Works Councils. International Framework Agreements have no legally binding 
power of enforcement.  
However, by taking a closer look at how these different cross-border threats could be 
combined and intertwined, the emerging transnational texture of labour regulation actually gains 
more and more contours. The example of International Framework Agreements that was 
mentioned illustrates this point quite well: when viewed in isolation of details of concrete 
implementation and monitoring, the ILO-core norms (or the content of IFAs in general) can – in 
many cases and with good reason – be considered to be little more than an open invitation to 
humanist window dressing. What constitutes the dynamics of the network texture in this context 
is the interplay of a normative framework for political processes of labour regulation. As Walby 
(2011: 141) notes, ‘“Human Rights” do not form a theory of how society functions, they are 
merely a list of goals’. If, however, these goals become embedded in the framework of a legitimate 
symbolic corporate actor (as in the case of the ILO), they can be referred to and used as tools by 
political agencies and other collective actors to improve conditions of work, employment and 
participation at the (shop-floor-) level of every life-world.10  
Therefore, the argument developed in this paper is that any given single element of the 
network texture can only be understood in relation to every other element. To pick single 
measures out of this network texture11 would be akin to attempting to watch a football match by 
focusing on only one of the twenty-two players. Rejecting such a narrow focus allows a more 
fruitful attempt to understand the dynamics of the internationalization of labour regulation as an 
emerging network texture. The idea of a transnational network texture (as well as the empirical 
findings supporting it) invites a strengthening of the sociological perspective of international 
labour relations and a relational approach which sees actors neither as principally isolated units 
(Sitkin and Bowen 2010), nor as phenomena which are simply brought about by purely 
structural conditions (Meyer et al 1997). 
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Viewed from a methodological perspective, the implications for conceptualizing research 
on international labour regulation become apparent. Since a significant amount of academic 
reflection about cross-border phenomena is based on research built around case studies, the 
question arises of the extent to which the focus on single issues already contains a starting point 
for a bias against our argument. As argued by various scholars (Burawoy 2009a; Marcus 1995), a 
narrow view on (seemingly) isolated phenomena often cannot capture the social preconditions 
and consequences of these phenomena.  
If one looks at the current debate on global governance, various problems and challenges 
are being addresses with regards to the democratic legitimacy of an international governance 
system, which is said to privilege decision-making processes in a top-down manner. Here, 
Krajewski (2009) points to three aspects which he perceives to be potentially problematic. First, 
decision-making on a global scale is practically taking place among representatives of only a few 
states. What’s more, since these decisions are made by a select few representatives and experts, the 
actual populations of the countries involved does not really have a voice in the committees. 
Thirdly, Krajewski perceives these negotiations to lack a complementary societal discourse with 
actual deliberative potential in terms of dealing with questions of international economic 
governance. Since the design of international organizations such as the European Union does not 
exactly favour bottom-up-initiatives, it now seems reasonable to ask whether the emerging texture 
of cross-border labour regulations can take the place of such a bottom-up approach. By giving a 
conceptual overview of the cross-border network texture of labour regulation as a structure that is 
growing more and more dense in the course of the internationalisation of worker representatives, 
one obviously also has to acknowledge that there are difficulties and challenges which have to be 
met by the initiatives engaging in this process.12 While thus perceiving a lot of coordination work 
to be done between representatives of workers, management, states and civil society, there seems 
to appear no alternative to this complex process of re-embedding the economy in society by such 







1.  For more on the protagonist role of the United States in global processes of neo-liberal 
economic modernization also see Kaufmann (2006: 152). It is questionable, whether the USA, 
the United Kingdom or other international actors like the International Monetary Fund with its 
debt restructuring programs after the so-called oil crisis were the decisive driving force of this turn 
towards liberal market strategies. Furthermore, as Minssen (2012: 178) points out correctly, it 
would be far-fetched to speak of a neoliberal project in the sense of a well-planned procedure, 
intentionally carried out by concrete identifiable actors. As social macro-processes which, among 
other things, lead to a reconfiguration of labour regulation are governable only to a slight degree, 
such general assertions can be suspected of actually belonging in the field of conspiracy theory.  
 
2.  Differences however remain with regards to the varying degrees of world-market integration 
which scholars assume for particular countries and macro-regions. While the major share of 
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international trade in the last quarter of the 21st century has mainly taken place within the triad of 
North America, Europe and Japan, the current debate around the BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India 
and China, sometimes also countries like Mexico or South Africa) effectively illustrates this point. 
 
3.  In so far as not every type of labour can be bought and sold anywhere on the globe, this is 
obviously an exaggeration. However, the increasing cross-border mobility of productive 
organizations towards cheap and adequate labour (internationalization of value chains) and of 
labour towards employment opportunities (internationalization of labour migration) constitutes a 
significant tendency for the analysis of economic developments. Accordingly, human and capital 
mobility have become structural characteristics of the world economy (see Pries 2010a for the 
case of labour migration). 
 
4.  Interestingly, the emergence and development of this movie-genre within the Anglo-American 
context can be traced back as developing in parallel with increasing liberalization in politics under 
the influence of Reaganomics and Thatcherism in the frame of the Washington Consensus. 
Ecological devastation, political anomy and a collective exhaustion as well as the constant thread 
of apocalypse serve as an allegory for the danger of a decline of civilization. It does not take a lot 
of fantasy to interpret this as a popular anticipation of the possible risks and dangers of neoliberal 
modernization. 
 
5.  Great Britain made use of its ability to opt-out and withdrew from the entire process only to 
join the EWC plan after Labour’s electoral victory in 1997. 
 
6.  As an alternative to a EWC the directive offers the option of defining a procedure of 
information and consultation. 
 
7.  For general information on EWCs see the EWC database (also available as a CD-ROM) at 
http://www.etuirehs.org/workers_participation/projects/european_works_councils_database__1.f.  
 
8.  See for example Thomas (2010); Fichter et al. (2011, 2011a); Papadakis (2011); Rüb et al 
(2011). 
 
9.   This number does not include suppliers and sub-contractors.  
 
10.  Moreover, the same sceptical arguments against the single mechanisms could also be made 
for the national level – there are many collective bargaining agreements which, although legally 
binding, have not had such strong regulatory power. 
 
11.  As for example Streeck (1997) does with regards to the perspectives of European Works 
Councils. 
 
12.  As is known from research on cross-border governance mechanisms or the emergence of 
structures perceived as e.g. ‘transnational communities’ (Djelic and Quack 2010), a core problem 
lies in the establishment of trust relations between the actors involved. Since such constellations 
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in an international context consists of actors, who are drawing on different institutional 
conditions (e.g. welfare-state-structures) or cultural background (e.g. stocks of knowledge among 
themselves and their local reference groups), coordination efforts arising in this context comprise 
– on the other hand – challenges beyond most experiences, traditionally made on a national level 
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